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I. dǂiƾƾ Ciǁil CƺƢƣ 
ᇳ. H؜ئاآإج
The first attempt to codify civil law in Switzerland was undertaken during the 
Helvetic Republic. However, with the decline of the Helvetic Republic in 1803, 
the work on a comprehensive Private Law Code ceased.
In the 19th century, most cantons adopted civil law legislation with the aim 
of ending legal fragmentation and to achieving legal certainty on a canto-
nal level. Whereas the French Code Civil of 1804 was used as a model for the 
(French and Italian speaking) cantons in western and southern Switzerland 
(Fribourg, Ticino, Vaud, Valais, Neuchâtel, and Geneva), other cantons 
(amongst others, Bern, Lucerne, Solothurn, and Aargau) based their legis-
lation on the Austrian Civil Law Code. A third group of German- speaking 
cantons in central and eastern Switzerland managed to, by and large, remain 
uninfluenced by foreign legislators in their enactment of comprehensive civil 
law legislation (for instance Zurich). Finally, a last group of central cantons 
(inter alia, Uri, Schwyz, Glarus, and Appenzell) completely abstained from 
enacting any comprehensive civil law legislation.1
One influential cantonal codification during this period was that made 
on behalf of the canton of Zurich by Jآ؛ؔءء Cؔئأؔإ B؟بءائؖ؛؟؜, a legal 
scholar and professor of law in Zurich, Munich, and Heidelberg. He drafted 
Switzerland’s first independently codified cantonal civil code which entered 
into force in 1856. B؟بءائؖ؛؟؜’s work was well- recognised both nationally 
and internationally and it served as a model for the later codification and har-
monisation of Swiss civil law on the federal level.
1 aؘاؘإ eبآإ/Bؘإء؛ؔإؗ dؖ؛ءجؘؗإ/Jöإؚ dؖ؛ؠ؜ؗ/é؟ؘثؔءؗإؔ Jبءؚآ, Das Schweizerische 
Zivilgesetzbuch, 14th edition, Zurich 2015, § 1 n. 2 et seqq.
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Figure 1: Johann Caspar Bluntschli (1808–1881)2
However, the Swiss civil law landscape was to remain heterogeneous 
throughout the second half of the 19th century. Due to their extensive auto-
nomy, the 25 cantons3 (i.e. federal states) retained their legislative inde-
pendence leading to a variety of civil codes, while there was a total lack of 
legislation in some cantons. As such, significantly different legal principles 
in the field of civil law could be applied to different cases depending on the 
canton at issue. In the 1860s, in the context of this complex landscape, the 
Swiss Lawyers’ Association called for a unified civil code at the federal level. 
However, the first attempt to provide the federal legislator with the compe-
tence to enact such a code was rejected by both the people and the cantons 
in 1872, although shortly thereafter, a limited federal competence to pass the 
federal Code of Obligations of 14 June 1881 was accepted by the people and the 
cantons.4 Finally, in 1898 the people and the cantons transferred the (non- 
exclusive) competence regarding civil law matters to the federal legislator.
ᇴ dƺǀƽơƣ: hikiƻƣƢiƞ, ǂiƿƩ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹơƣ ƿƺ: cƣƻƽƺƢǀơƿiƺƹ ƤƽƺƸ kǀƽiơƩè ᅬ GƣƾơƩiơƩƿƣ Kǀlƿǀƽ 
hiƽƿƾơƩƞƤƿ. GƣƟƽüƢƣƽ Fƽƣƿǅ, kǀƽiơƩ ᇳᇻᇵᇴ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇷKNN- iFGbᄭ.
3 Today, there are 26 cantons within the Swiss confederation. This has been the case since 
1979 when the canton of Jura seceded from the canton of Bern by popular vote.
4 éƾ ƞ Ƹƞƿƿƣƽ ƺƤ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiǁƣ lƞǂ, ƿƩƣ CƺƢƣ ƺƤ OƟliƨƞƿiƺƹƾèᅬ ƞlƿƩƺǀƨƩ ƞƢƺƻƿƣƢ ƣƞƽliƣƽèᅬ iƾ 
the fifth part of the Civil Code. However, the Code of Obligations formally and in terms 
of general use is considered a distinct codification with a separate Article numbering. 
Peter Georg Picht / Goran Studen: Civil Law 275
ᇴ. Lؘؚ؜ئ؟ؔا؜آء
The Federal Council mandated Eبؘؚء Hبؘؕإ, a professor of state law, private 
law and legal history at the Universities of Basel, Halle, and Bern, to draw up a 
comparative compendium of all existing cantonal civil codes. From 1886 until 
1893,5 Hبؘؕإ published his comparative analysis in four separate volumes.
Figure 2: Eugen Huber (1849–1923)6
Following the comparative analysis, Hبؘؕإ published the first draft of the 
Civil Code in 1900. Until 1904, a commission of experts deliberated on the 
draft. Finally, on 10 December 1907, the Code was adopted by the Federal 
Assembly: It officially came into force on 1 January 1912.
Therefore, this chapter does not address the Code of Obligations and its underlying prin-
ciples (for details on the Code of Obligations see the Chapter Law of Obligations, pp. 305).
5 Notably, Hبؘؕإ’s assistance was mandated several years before the referendum in 1898 
took place which granted the federal legislator the competence to codify civil law. This 
was also the situation with the Criminal Code: although the assistance of Cؔإ؟ dاآآئئ 
was mandated in 1892, the legislative competence was not granted to the federation until 
1898. The most probable explanation behind this is that the Federal Council was fairly 
confident that the referendum would pass and was merely a formality; thus they wanted 
to push the project immediately; see for details on the Criminal Code the Chapter on 
Criminal Law, pp. 369.
6 dƺǀƽơƣ: hikiƻƣƢiƞ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/Ebᇹe- Eᇴfgᄭ. 
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ᇵ. Cآءاؘءا7
The Civil Code is comprised of 977 Articles. It also contains, in a “final title”, 
251 commencement and implementing provisions which, inter alia, regu-
late the transitional relationship between this federal Code and its cantonal 
predecessors. 
After the ten introductory Articles which contain general principles of 
Swiss law (application of the law, good faith, relationship between federal and 
cantonal law, and rules of evidence), the Civil Code is divided into four parts.
Part 1 (Articles 11–89c) covers the Law of Persons and mainly regulates the 
legal personality of natural and legal persons, legal capacity as well as the 
protection of legal personality in case of infringements. It also addresses 
ƿƩƣèiƾƾǀƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƽƣƨiƾƿƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ơiǁil ƾƿƞƿǀƾ. éƹƺƿƩƣƽ Ƥƺơǀƾ ƺƤ aƞƽƿ ᇳ iƾ lƣƨƞl ƻƣƽ-
ƾƺƹƾ. eƩƣ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ ƺƤ éƽƿiơlƣƾèᇷᇴᅬᇷᇻ ơƺƹƿƞiƹ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƻƽiƹơiƻ-
les that are universally applicable to all legal persons under Swiss law (such 
as the separate legal personality of legal persons, their capacity to act and to 
acquire rights and obligations, their seat, and rules pertaining to their dis-
solution), while Articles 60–79 specifically address associations and Articles 
80–89a deal with foundations. The last two Articles (Articles 89b and 89c) are 
ƢƣƢiơƞƿƣƢ ƿƺ ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ ơƺllƣơƿiǁƣ ƞƾƾƣƿƾèᅬ i.ƣ. ƤǀƹƢƾ ƽƞiƾƣƢ ƟǄ ǂƞǄ ƺƤ ƞ ƻǀƟliơ 
ơƺllƣơƿiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ ơƩƞƽiƿƞƟlƣ ƻǀƽƻƺƾƣƾèᅬ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƹƺ ƞƽƽƞƹƨƣƸƣƹƿƾ Ʃƞǁƣ Ɵƣƣƹ ƸƞƢƣ 
with regards to the management or use of such funds.
Part 2 is dedicated to Family Law (Articles 90–456). It addresses the marital 
law and the marital property law. Although Swiss law does not (yet) allow 
for same-sex marriages, since 2007 the registered partnership between per-
sons of the same sex is regulated in a separate federal law. The family law 
also contains provisions on kinship and, inter alia, regulates the parent- child 
relationship. An entire section (Articles 360–456) sets out measures for the 
protection of adults (including measures for legally incompetent persons and 
the deputyship) and introduces the instruments of the health care proxy and 
the living will into Swiss civil law.8
Part 3 of the Civil Code (Articles 457–640) deals with the Law of Succession 
and is subdivided into provisions relating to heirs, testamentary freedom and 
7 In the following text, where Articles are mentioned without referencing their source 
of law, they are located in the Swiss Civil Code of 10 December 1907, SR 210; see for an 
EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Ciǁil CƺƢƣ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/DgᇺN- FFeᇴᄭ.
8 The rules pertaining to the protection of minors and adults, which completely over-
hauled the former custodianship law, entered into force on 1 January 2013. 
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testamentary dispositions, executors, the commencement and legal effects of 
succession as well as the division of the estate.
Part 4 (Articles 641–977) focuses on Property Law. It contains rules regar-
Ƣiƹƨ ƺǂƹƣƽƾƩiƻ iƹ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl, lƞƹƢ ƺǂƹƣƽƾƩiƻ, ƞƹƢ ƺǂƹƣƽƾƩiƻ ƺƤ ơƩƞƿƿƣl. aƞƽƿèᇶ 
also regulates limited rights in rem (e.g. usufruct and other personal servitu-
des, right of residence and building rights), charges on immovable property 
(mortgages and mortgage certificates as personal obligations), and charges on 
chattel (such as pledges and liens). Swiss property law also contains rules on 
possession, including the legal definition of possession, rules pertaining to 
the transfer of possession, and legal remedies in case of interference. The final 
provisions of Part 4 cover formal and material aspects of the land register.
Swiss Civil Code (SCC)
IntroduĐion
General Principles 
(Art. 1-10)
Part I
Law of Persons
(Art. 11-89c)
1. Natural Persons
– Legal Personality
–	 Registraion	of	Ciǀil	
Status
Ϯ.	 Legal	Eniies
–	 General	Proǀisions	
–	 AssoĐiaions
–	 Foundaions
ϯ.	 Collecive	Assets
Part II
Family Law
(Art. 90-456)
1. Marital Law
– Marriage
–	 DiǀorĐe	and	 
Separaion
–	 General	EfeĐts	of	
Marriage
– Marital Property 
Law
2. Kinship
ϯ.	 Protecion	of	
Adults
– Own Arrangements 
for	Care
–	 OiĐial	Measures
–	 Organisaion
Part III
Law of Succession
(Art. 457-640)
1. Heirs
– Statutory Heirs
– Testamentary 
Disposiions
2. Succession
Part IV
Property Law
(Art. 641-977)
1. Ownership
–	 General	Proǀisions
– Land Ownership
–	 Chatel	Oǁnership
1. Ownership
–	 General	Proǀisions
– Land Ownership
–	 Chatel	Oǁnership
3. Possession and 
the Land Register
Part V
Code	of	Oďligaions
Figure 3: Structure of the Civil Code
ᇶ. Mؔإ؜اؔ؟ aإآأؘإاج Lؔت
Swiss family law establishes three marital property regimes to govern the 
ƺǂƹƣƽƾƩiƻ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ: ᄬiᄭè ƿƩƣ Ƹƞƽiƿƞl ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ ƽƣƨiƸƣ ƺƤ ƻƞƽƿiơiƻƞ-
tion in acquired property (Errungenschaftsbeteiligungᄭ, ᄬiiᄭè ƿƩƣè ơƺƸƸǀ-
nity of property (Gütergemeinschaftᄭ, ƞƹƢ ᄬiiiᄭè ƿƩƣ ƾƣƻƞƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ 
(Gütertrennung). As participation in acquired property constitutes the default, 
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it applies if the spouses do not choose a different regime by marital agree-
Ƹƣƹƿ ᄬƣiƿƩƣƽ ƟǄ ǂƞǄ ƺƤ ƞ ƻƽƣƹǀƻƿiƞl ƞƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ƻƽiƺƽ ƿƺ Ƹƞƽƽiƞƨƣ/ơiǁil ǀƹiƺƹ 
or by a contract amending an existing matrimonial property regime follo-
ǂiƹƨ Ƹƞƽƽiƞƨƣ/ơiǁil ǀƹiƺƹᄭ. 
The marital property regime of participation in acquired property 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾèᇳᇻᇸᅬᇴᇴᇲᄭ ƢiƾƿiƹƨǀiƾƩƣƾ ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ ƞơƼǀiƽƣƢ Ƣǀƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ Ƹƞƽƽiƞƨƣ ƤƽƺƸ 
the individual property belonging to each individual spouse. Consequently, 
two different types of property can be distinguished, namely the individual 
ƞƾƾƣƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƾƻƺǀƾƣƾ/ƽƣƨiƾƿƣƽƣƢ ƻƞƽƿƹƣƽƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƞƾƾƣƿƾ ƿƩƣǄ ƞơƼǀiƽƣƢ Ƣǀƽiƹƨ 
the marriage or registered partnership.9
The acquired property under this regime comprises the assets which a 
spouse acquired for valuable consideration during the marital property 
regime, in particular:
– proceeds from employment (e.g. salaries);
– benefits received from staff welfare schemes, social security, and so-
cial welfare institutions; 
– compensation for inability to work;
– income derived from individual property; and 
– property acquired to replace or substitute acquired assets.
BǄ ƺƻƣƽƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ lƞǂ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇻᇹᄭ, ƞ ƾƻƺǀƾƣ’ƾ individual property comprises: 
– personal belongings used exclusively by that spouse (e.g. jewellery, 
musical instruments, etc.); 
– assets belonging to one spouse as well as donated and inherited 
property; 
– claims for satisfaction; and 
– acquisitions substituting or replacing individual assets.
The marital property regime is dissolved (i) through divorce, (ii) on the 
death of a spouse, or (iii) on the implementation of a different regime. In the 
case of dissolution of the marital property regime of participation in acquired 
9 By default, registered partners live under the property regime of separation of property, 
see Article 18 of the Federal Act on Registered Partnership for Same Sex Couples of 18 
June 2004, SR. 211.231. However, registered partners can opt- in and declare applicable 
the principles of the regime of participation in acquired property, by way of a property 
agreement.
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ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ, ƣƞơƩ ƾƻƺǀƾƣ ᄬƺƽ, iƹ ơƞƾƣ ƺƤ Ƣiƾƾƺlǀƿiƺƹ ǀƻƺƹ ƢƣƞƿƩ, Ʃiƾ/Ʃƣƽ Ʃƣiƽƾᄭ 
keeps his or her individual property and the spouses (or the surviving spouse 
with the deceased spouse’s heirs) settle their debts to one another. The distri-
bution of the property which was acquired during the marriage depends on 
the surplus or deficit of each spouse’s acquired property, whereby each spouse 
is entitled to one- half of the surplus of the other spouse.
The marital property regime of community of property comprises two types 
of property: the individual assets of each spouse and the common assets of 
the couple. If the community of property regime is dissolved by the death of 
a spouse or the implementation of a different marital property regime, each 
party is entitled to one- half of the common assets and may keep his or her 
own individual assets.
Finally, in the separation of property regime only one type of property 
exists, namely the individual property of each spouse. Each spouse, within 
the limits of the law, administers and enjoys the benefits of his or her indivi-
dual property. If the regime of separation of property is dissolved, each spouse 
is entitled to his or her individual property.
ᇷ. aإآ؛؜ؕ؜ا؜آء آؙ Mؔ؜ءاؘءؔءؘؖ Fآبءؗؔا؜آءئ ؔءؗ 
Fؘؘ eؔ؜؟ئ
éƽƿiơlƣè ᇵᇵᇷ I ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƾ ƿƩƞƿ ƞƾƾƣƿƾ ƸƞǄ Ɵƣ ƿiƣƢ ƿƺ ƞ ƤƞƸilǄ ƟǄ Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƺƤ ƞ 
family foundation created under the Law of Persons or Inheritance Law (see 
Article 80 I) to meet the costs of raising, endowing or supporting family mem-
bers, or for other “similar purposes”. However, the establishment of (new) fee 
tails (Fideikommiss) is explicitly prohibited (Article 335 II, Article 488 II).10 
This prohibition of fee tails aims at preventing the preservation and accumu-
lation of wealth in dynastic family structures.
The Federal Supreme Court follows a strict interpretation of the phrase 
“similar purposes” contained in Article 335. In a key ruling it held that 
the establishment of family foundations for maintenance purposes 
10 Fee tails in civil law jurisdictions were a way of connecting assets to a certain family over 
generations by bequeathing them from father to, traditionally, eldest son thereby, pre-
venting desegregation of the family assets (e.g. lands, castles, etc.). Nowadays common- 
law trusts and, in some jurisdictions, family foundations can serve similar purposes.
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(Unterhaltsstiftungen) is not permissible.11 However, considering the historic 
will of the legislator at the time of the Civil Code’s enactment, this ruling 
was neither imperative nor convincing in the light of modern foundation 
law developments and the generally liberal approach of the Swiss civil law. 
Perhaps indicating a shift towards a less strict approach, the Federal Supreme 
Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƣlƢ iƹ ᇴᇲᇲᇻ ƿƩƞƿ éƽƿiơlƣèᇵᇵᇷ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƣƢ ƞ ƾƺ- ơƞllƣƢ loi d’ap-
plication immédiate preventing the legal recognition of maintenance founda-
tions established under foreign law.12
ᇸ. Iء؛ؘإ؜اؔءؘؖ Lؔت
As a consequence of the freedom to dispose of one’s property as one sees fit 
inter vivos ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇸᇶᇳᄭ, dǂiƾƾ iƹƩƣƽiƿƞƹơƣ lƞǂ ƾƿiƻǀlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƤƽƣƣƢƺƸ ƿƺ ƻƞƾƾ 
ƺƹ ǂƣƞlƿƩ ƞƿ ƢƣƞƿƩ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ ƿƩƣ Ƹƣƞƹƾ ƺƤ ƞ ǂill ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇶᇹᇲ Iᄭ. hiƿƩiƹ ƿƩƣ 
numerus clausus of types of testamentary dispositions, the testator may, in 
ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ, ƤƽƣƣlǄ ƞllƺơƞƿƣ Ʃiƾ ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ ƞƤƿƣƽ Ʃiƾ ƢƣƞƿƩ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇶᇺᇳ Iᄭ. eƩƣ Ciǁil 
Code stipulates testaments and contracts of succession as the two main types 
of wills. If the testator decides not to make a will, the Civil Code designates 
his offspring, spouse, and other family members as statutory heirs who are 
ƣliƨiƟlƣ Ƥƺƽ ƞ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ Ƽǀƺƿƞ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƣƾƿƞƿƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾèᇶᇷᇹᅬᇶᇸᇸᄭ.
Pursuant to Article 542, an heir must be alive and capable of inheriting 
at the time of succession. While natural persons can inherit both as statu-
tory and testamentary heirs, legal persons can only be appointed as heirs by 
way of a testamentary disposition. In certain constellations (for example if 
a person wilfully and unlawfully caused or attempted to cause the death of 
the decedent) a person will be regarded as unworthy (i.e. incapable) of inhe-
ƽiƿiƹƨ ƿƩǀƾ ƣǃơlǀƢiƹƨ ƾǀơƩ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ ƞƾ ƾƿƞƿǀƿƺƽǄ ƞƹƢ/ƺƽ ƿƣƾƿƞƸƣƹƿƞƽǄ Ʃƣiƽ 
(Articles 540 et seq.). By operation of law the excluded person’s issue inherit 
from the deceased as if the person unworthy to inherit had predeceased the 
deceased.
fƹlƣƾƾ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƾƿƞƿƺƽ Ʃƞƾèᅬ lƣƨiƿiƸƞƿƣlǄèᅬ ƢƣƻƽiǁƣƢ ƞƹ Ʃƣiƽ ƺƤ Ʃiƾ ƺƽ Ʃƣƽ ƾƿƞ-
tutory heirship by way of disinheritance (Articles 477 et seqq., for example 
where the heir has committed a serious crime against the testator or a person 
close to the testator), the freedom to make a will is significantly limited by 
11 BGE 71 I 265.
12 BGE 135 III 614.
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Switzerland’s restrictive regime of forced shares. Under this regime, only the 
“disposable part” of a testator’s assets can be passed- on at his or her discretion 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇶᇹᇲ Iᄭ, ǂƩilƣ ƞ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiƞl Ƽǀƺƿƞ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƾƿƞƿƺƽ’ƾ ƞƾƾƣƿƾ iƾ ƞǁƞilƞƟlƣ 
to the testator’s offspring, spouse, and parents (again, unless the testator can 
disinherit one or more of the aforementioned persons).13 This is a statutory 
entitlement. Moreover, the statutory heirs do not simply receive the right to 
make a claim for payment against the testator’s estate; they become heirs ex 
lege. Finally, to protect against the possibility of the testator abusively eva-
ding the heir’s statutory rights inter vivos, the testator’s freedom to dispose of 
his or her assets inter vivos is limited by the possibility of an abatement of such 
ƿƽƞƹƾƞơƿiƺƹƾ ƞƤƿƣƽ Ʃiƾ ƺƽ Ʃƣƽ ƢƣƞƿƩ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇷᇴᇹᄭ. 
Example: At the time of his death the testator, whose spouse had died a 
couple of years earlier, leaves a daughter and assets of around CHF 1 million. 
The testator who had always lived with an attitude “to leave the world a bet-
ter place” had, over a period of three years prior to his death, made various 
donations of CHF 9 million in total to a charitable institution. In his testa-
ment the testator has appointed his daughter as sole heiress. Although the 
daughter had, from a formal point of view, been appointed as sole heiress, 
the inter- vivos- donations substantially undermine her compulsory share. 
Without the deceased’s donations the estate would have amounted to CHF 10 
million and the daughter would, from a legal point of view, have been entitled 
to a compulsory portion of ¾ of the estate (Article 471 I), i.e. CHF 7.5 million. 
However, in economic terms she only gets CHF 1 million under the testament. 
According to Article 527 III gifts made in the last five years before the decea-
sed’s death are subject to abatement. As a result, the daughter can demand 
CHF 6.5 million from the donee (i.e. the charitable institution) to fully restore 
her compulsory portion of the heritage. 
Another key characteristic of Swiss inheritance law is the principle of eo 
ipso ƞơƼǀiƾiƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƞƹ ƣƾƿƞƿƣ ƿƩƽƺǀƨƩ ǀƹiǁƣƽƾƞl ƾǀơơƣƾƾiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇷᇸᇲᄭ. fƻƺƹ 
the death of the deceased, the estate in its entirety vests Ƣƿ ƳƢƧƢ)in the heirs. 
According to the eo ipso acquisition, the heirs acquire all of the deceased’s 
assets and debts automatically and without a requirement for any formal act 
ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣ Ʃƣiƽƾ ƞƹƢ/ƺƽ ƞƹǄ ƞƢƸiƹiƾƿƽƞƿiǁƣ ƺƽ jǀƢiơiƞl ƟƺƢǄ. éƾ ƞ ƽƣƾǀlƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
principle of universal succession the deceased’s claims, rights of ownership, 
limited rights in rem, and rights of possession automatically pass to the heirs 
13 Currently, a draft legislation proposes abolishing the compulsory portion of the parents 
and reducing the offspring’s compulsory portion from ¾ to ½ of their statutory share.
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while the debts of the deceased become the personal debts of the heirs. The 
principle applies to both statutory and testamentary heirs. In order to pro-
ƿƣơƿ Ʃƣiƽƾ ƤƽƺƸ ƽƣơƣiǁiƹƨ ǀƹǂƞƹƿƣƢ ƺƽ ƺǁƣƽ- iƹƢƣƟƿƣƢ/iƹƾƺlǁƣƹƿ ƣƾƿƞƿƣƾ, ƣǁƣƽǄ 
Ʃƣiƽ Ʃƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ ƽƣƹƺǀƹơƣ ƿƩƣ iƹƩƣƽiƿƞƹơƣ ǂiƿƩiƹ ƿƩƽƣƣ ƸƺƹƿƩƾ ƞƤƿƣƽ Ʃƣ/
she learned of the death of the deceased (Article 567). In addition, there is 
a legal presumption in favour of renunciation in case of insolvent estates 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇷᇸᇸᄭ. 
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II. aƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ
ᇳ. Aأأ؟؜ؖؔا؜آء ؔءؗ Iءاؘإأإؘاؔا؜آء آؙ ا؛ؘ Lؔت
éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ éƽƿiơlƣè ᇳ, ǂƩiơƩ ƞƢƢƽƣƾƾƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƽƣlƞƿiƺƹƾƩiƻ Ɵƣƿǂƣƣƹ ƾƿƞƿǀƿƺƽǄ 
law and judicial power, the law must be applied by the courts to all legal ques-
tions it provides an answer to, by directly applying its wording or by inter-
preting its terms. However, in the absence of an applicable provision, a court 
shall decide in accordance with customary law and, in the absence of custo-
mary law, in accordance with the rule that it would establish itself if it were 
the legislator. When applying and interpreting the law, the court shall follow 
established doctrine and tradition. 
Article 1 can be regarded as the civil law’s expression of the cons-
titutionally protected and fundamental principle of the rule of law 
(Rechtsstaatlichkeitsgrundsatz) in the following ways. Firstly, it provides for 
the separation of powers by requiring a court to apply the law in cases where 
it is applicable. The legislator passes laws as abstract and general rules; thus it 
is for the courts to concretely apply the law in each individual case. Secondly, 
Article 1 dictates that, when interpreting the law, the courts must follow esta-
blished methodology. Although the reference to doctrine and tradition in 
éƽƿiơlƣèᇳ iƾ ƹƺƿ ƣǃƩƞǀƾƿiǁƣ, ƿƩiƾ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹơƣ Ƣƺƣƾ ƣǃƻliơiƿlǄ iƢƣƹƿiƤǄ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƢ 
Ƣƺơƿƽiƹƣ ƞƹƢ ơƞƾƣèlƞǂ ƞƾ ƿǂƺ ƽƣlƣǁƞƹƿ ơƺƹƾiƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƸƣƿƩƺƢƺlƺƨiơƞl iƹƿƣƽ-
pretation in the process of finding justice.14 eƩiƽƢlǄ, éƽƿiơlƣèᇳ ơƺƹƿƞiƹƾ ƿƩƣ pro-
hibition of arbitrary decisions. In cases where the legislator has not passed any 
legislation, the courts cannot simply decide the case as they see fit. Instead, 
this provision stipulates a process according to which a court must resort to 
customary (e.g. local or professional) laws, if available. If neither explicit nor 
customary laws exist, the court must put itself in the shoes of the legislature 
and establish a rule that could serve as a general statutory law- provision. Even 
14 “Tradition” within the meaning of Article 1 includes established case law as well as estab-
lished administrative practice, see eبآإ/dؖ؛ءجؘؗإ/dؖ؛ؠ؜ؗ, §èᇷ ƹ.èᇵᇹ ƣƿèƾƣƼƼ.
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in this scenario, the court is not permitted unfettered discretion. By dictating 
that the court must “act as legislator”, éƽƿiơlƣèᇳ ƢƣƸƞƹƢƾ ƞ ƾƿƽǀơƿǀƽƣƢ ƞƻƻƽƺ-
ach, and thereby subtly yet effectively reminds courts of the fundamental 
ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƽǀlƣ ƺƤ lƞǂèᅬ ƾǀơƩ ƞƾ ƻƽƺƻƺƽƿiƺƹƞliƿǄ ƞƹƢ lƣƨƞl ƣƼǀƞliƿǄ.
Whilst interpreting the law, the Federal Supreme Court utilises the follo-
wing common legal interpretation methods:
– grammatical interpretation relying on the wording, syntax, and lin-
guistic usage of the relevant text thereby giving words their literal, 
usual, and grammatical meaning;
– systematic interpretation by contextualising a provision within the 
overall legal and statutory framework;
– teleological interpretation which involves a consideration of the pur-
pose and rationale (telos) of a certain provision;
– realistic interpretation which demands that the result of an interpret-
ation must also consider questions of practicability; 
– historic interpretation considering either the legislator’s original will 
or relying on a more flexible historic intention, which may take into 
account later developments; and
– constitutional interpretation requiring courts to choose an interpret-
ation that is best in line with the fundamental values enshrined in the 
Swiss Constitution.15
It should be noted that there is no hierarchy between these methods of inter-
pretation; no method has greater importance or is accorded greater weight 
than the others. Instead, the Federal Supreme Court employs a “pragmatic” 
pluralism of methods. According to this approach, the law must primarily be 
interpreted integrally: its wording, meaning, and purpose as well as its under-
lying values and inherent rationale all must be part of the consideration. 
The interpretation must not be solely based on the wording of the provision. 
Instead, the relevant rule must be considered within the context of the law in 
a broader sense, and as something which can only be properly understood and 
ơƺƹơƽƣƿiƾƣƢèǂƩƣƹ ơƺƹƤƽƺƹƿƣƢ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ Ƥƞơƿƾ ƺƤ ƞƹ iƹƢiǁiƢǀƞl ơƞƾƣ. Iƹ ƿƩiƾ ǂƞǄ, 
the rule ultimately comes to life through interpretation.16 
15 BGE 106 Ia 33. 
16 BGE 136 III 23, consideration 6.6.2.1. 
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This pragmatic approach is being criticised in the legal doctrine. On clo-
ser examination, it can very well be argued that the Federal Supreme Court 
simply wants to keep the door open for any future interpretation of a certain 
law. Whether such blurring of boundaries between the different interpreta-
tion methods is strengthening legal certainty, is, however, highly doubtful. 
In addition, it becomes more difficult to draw the line between admissible 
further development of the law through judicial decisions (e.g. to close a legal 
loophole) and inadmissible judicial legislation.
ᇴ. Gآآؗ Fؔ؜ا؛
éƹƺƿƩƣƽ ƤǀƹƢƞƸƣƹƿƞl ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ dǂiƾƾ ơiǁil lƞǂ iƾ ƣƹƾƩƽiƹƣƢ iƹ éƽƿiơlƣèᇴ: ƣǁƣƽǄ 
person must act in good faith when exercising his or her rights or fulfilling his or 
her obligations. Further, this provision clarifies that the manifest abuse of a right 
is not protected by law. The general principle of good faith is not limited to civil 
law, but is universally applicable and has validity in all aspects of Swiss law.17
This general rule of good faith (bona fide) can be divided into two 
sub- principles: 
(i) the principle of mutual respect and consideration when exercising 
rights and fulfilling legal obligations; and 
(ii) the prohibition of abuse of rights. 
The principle of good faith requires that the parties to a legal relationship 
(regardless of whether the basis of the relationship is the law or a contract) 
act in an appropriate and honest manner, remaining loyal to their legal obli-
ƨƞƿiƺƹƾ. Iƹ ƿƩiƾ ƽƣƨƞƽƢ, éƽƿiơlƣèᇴ ơƺƢiƤiƣƾ ƞƹƢ ơƩƞƹƹƣlƾ ǀƹiǁƣƽƾƞl Ƹƺƽƞl ƞƹƢ 
philosophical ideas of integrity into the civil law.18
17 BGE 83 II 345: “Article 2 of the Civil Code contains a general rule which applies in addition to 
individual legal norms, and which claims validity also outside the scope of federal civil law, 
e.g. in cantonal procedural law […].”; see also the Chapter on Administrative Law, p. 200.
18 Hence, it is not surprising that the sub- principle of mutual respect has, in fact, a lot 
in common with Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ Kؔءا’ئ categorical imperative: “Act only according to 
that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal 
law”, Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ Kؔءا, GƽƺǀƹƢǂƺƽk ƺƤ ƿƩƣ MƣƿƞƻƩǄƾiơƾ ƺƤ Mƺƽƞlƾ, iƹ IƸƸƞƹǀƣl Kƞƹƿ, 
aƽƞơƿiơƞl aƩilƺƾƺƻƩǄ, eƩƣ CƞƸƟƽiƢƨƣ EƢiƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ hƺƽkƾ ƺƤ IƸƸƞƹǀƣl Kƞƹƿ, ƿƽƞƹƾlƞƿƣƢ 
and edited by Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge 2008, pp. 37.
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The principle of good faith reveals an important facet of Swiss civil law: 
éƽƿiơlƣè ᇴ iƾ ƿƩƣ ƨƞƿƣǂƞǄ ƞƹƢ Ƥƺơƞl ƻƺiƹƿ Ƥƺƽ lƣƨƞl iƹƿƣƽƻƽƣƿƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ, ƞƸƺƹƨ 
others, contracts, actions, etc., and, where necessary, the creation of amend-
ments or supplements to legal declarations of intention. Declarations of 
intention (such as declarations aiming at the conclusion of a contract), 
which are unclear, vague, or ambiguous and thus open to various interpre-
tations, will be interpreted in accordance with the so- called principle of trust 
(Vertrauensprinzip).19 This principle mandates that in cases where the true 
intention of the declaring party cannot be unequivocally established, the 
declaration will be interpreted as the receiving party, in good faith, could and 
should have understood it.
Other facets of the principle of good faith are the rule against unusual clau-
ses (Ungewöhnlichkeitsregel) and the ambiguity rule (Unklarheitenregel). In 
particular, in the context of general terms and conditions (GTCs), where an 
unusual or surprising wording was implemented without this being explicitly 
notified, it will not be considered binding on the weaker or less experienced 
party. Furthermore, ambiguous wording will be interpreted by the court to 
the detriment of the author of such a clause.
The prohibition of the abuse of rights allows Swiss courts to rectify or prevent 
a result which, although correct from a purely formalistic legal point of view, 
would be ethically and morally questionable. It leaves room for correcting or 
preventing unbearable consequences which might otherwise undermine the 
trust of the people in the legal system’s ability to provide fair and reasonable 
(and morally understandable) results.20 According to established case law of 
the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland a blatant abuse of the law will not 
Ɵƣ ƨƽƞƹƿƣƢ lƣƨƞl ƻƽƺƿƣơƿiƺƹ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇴ IIᄭ.21 Whether an exercise of rights is 
abusive must be determined in light of all the facts and circumstances of the 
individual case. Case- law has established certain types of conduct which will 
be considered abusive such as, amongst others, the exercise of a right which 
19 This applies to declarations of intention to be received by the other party (empfangs-
bedürftige Willenserklärungen). In case of a unilateral declaration of intention, which 
does not need to be received by another party to become legally binding (e.g. testament), 
the Federal Supreme Court applies the so- called principle of intent (Willenstheorie) 
according to which only the true and real intention of the declaring party is relevant 
(and not the interpretation of a hypothetical and [quasi- ] objective receiving third 
ƻƞƽƿǄᄭèᅬ ƞƾ lƺƹƨ ƞƾ ƿƩƣ iƹƿƣƽƻƽƣƿƞƿiƺƹ ƽƣƾǀlƿ ơƞƹ Ɵƣ ƽƣơƺƹơilƣƢ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ ǂƺƽƢiƹƨ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
declaration.
20 BGE 125 III 257, consideration 2 a.
21 éƸƺƹƨ ƺƿƩƣƽƾ, JǀƢƨƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ᇶé_ᇳᇶᇳ/ᇴᇲᇲᇺ ƺƤ ᇺ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇻ.
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is not justified by any legitimate interest, the misuse of a legal institution for 
inappropriate interests or the contradictory use of rights in a manner that 
ǁiƺlƞƿƣƾ ǁƞliƢ ƣǃƻƣơƿƞƿiƺƹƾ ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ ƻƽiƺƽ ơƺƹƢǀơƿ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, éƽƿiơlƣèᇴ II iƾ ƿƺ 
be applied restrictively and only where the results of strictly applying the law 
would be severely unjust.
Example: With the aim of reducing taxes and duties, the seller and buyer 
of a building plot decide to formally reduce the official purchase price in the 
notarial deed of sale from CHF 6 million to CHF 5 million. However, they 
agree that the buyer shall pay the seller the difference in cash. If the buyer, 
upon signing of the notarial deed of sale, refuses to pay the additional CHF 
1 million, the seller cannot claim invalidity of the notarised purchase agree-
ment in order to get back ownership of the building plot in return for refund 
of the purchase price. Although, from a formal point of view, the notarised 
purchase agreement would be deemed invalid because it did not contain the 
correct purchase price and, therefore, does not fulfil the requirement that the 
entire agreement regarding the sale of land requires the notarial form, such 
approach could promote illicit behaviour of colluding parties and undermine 
the trust of the general public. Therefore, Article 2 II prohibits the seller from 
invoking the invalidity argument.22
One important group of cases revolves around the argument of venire con-
tra factum proprium whereby the contradictory conduct of one party is san-
ctioned if the other party, based on the previous conduct (either by action or 
omission) of the former, could reasonably expect a different behaviour and 
has made (financial) arrangements (e.g. investments) as a result of his or her 
expectations.
EǃƞƸƻlƣ: CƺƸƻƞƹǄ i ᄬƞ liƸiƿƣƢ liƞƟiliƿǄ ơƺƸƻƞƹǄ, GmbH) has rented busi-
ness premises from company Y (a company limited by shares, AG) for a fixed 
period of ten years. According to the rental agreement, the parties agreed to 
start negotiating the terms and conditions of a contract renewal three months 
prior to the end of the ten- year period. During the negotiations the CEO of 
company Y repeatedly stated both verbally and in various e- mails that the 
22 Interestingly, in similar cases (BGE 92 II 323 and BGE 104 II 99) the Federal Court de-
clined to set Article 2 II aside on the basis that the other party had willfully colluded in 
such illicit conduct. Instead, the court emphasised that the legal situation created by 
the parties as a result of the notarised deed of sale (i.e. the transfer of ownership and the 
changes registered in the land register) justified rejecting the formally correct argument 
of invalidity in order to uphold the public reliance and faith with regards to entries in the 
land register.
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lessor wanted to sign a new rental agreement (substantially in line with the 
previous one which allowed the tenant to modify the premises according to 
ƿƩƣ ƿƣƹƞƹƿ’ƾ ƹƣƣƢƾᄭ ǂiƿƩ ơƺƸƻƞƹǄ i “because of the great personal and busi-
ness relationship” between the two parties. 
Against this background and expecting to stay in the business premises for 
ƞƹƺƿƩƣƽ Ƥiǁƣ ƿƺ ƿƣƹ Ǆƣƞƽƾ, ơƺƸƻƞƹǄ i ƾƿƞƽƿƣƢ ƿƺ Ƹƞkƣ ƾǀƟƾƿƞƹƿiƞl ƽƣƹƺǁƞƿiƺƹƾ 
and modifications in the rented space. During this time the parties negotiated 
the terms of a new contract. Company Y CEO has frequently visited the rented 
ƻƽƣƸiƾƣƾ ǂƩƣƽƣ Ʃƣ ơƺƸƻliƸƣƹƿƣƢ CƺƸƻƞƹǄ i ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƾƿƽǀơƿiƺƹ ǂƺƽkƾ. 
However, on the day of the official expiry of the old rental agreement and with 
only minor issues left to negotiate, the CEO of company Y suddenly sent an e-mail 
ƿƺ ơƺƸƻƞƹǄ i ƾƿƞƿiƹƨ ƿƩƞƿ “as you are aware, the rental agreement is expiring today” 
ƞƹƢ ƢƣƸƞƹƢƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ ơƺƸƻƞƹǄ i ƿƺ “remove any installations and to make sure to 
hand over the premises in the original condition by 5.00 pm today at the latest”. 
Iƹ ƿƩiƾ ơƞƾƣ ơƺƸƻƞƹǄ i ơƺǀlƢ, ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ CEO’ƾ ƟƣƩƞǁiƺǀƽ, ƽƣƞƾƺƹƞƟlǄ 
expect to sign a new rental agreement which would also allow the tenant to 
make renovations and modifications to the rented premises. By repeatedly 
ƾiƨƹƞlliƹƨ ƿƺ ơƺƸƻƞƹǄ i Ƣǀƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƹƣƨƺƿiƞƿiƺƹƾ, ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƹƣ ƩƞƹƢ, ƿƩƞƿ ƞ ơƺƹ-
tract renewal could be expected and, on the other hand, by abruptly abando-
ning the negotiations, CEO of company Y has acted in a contradictory manner. 
As a result and based on Article 2 II, Y can neither claim that the original 
ƽƣƹƿƞl ƞƨƽƣƣƸƣƹƿ ƣǃƻiƽƣƢ ƹƺƽ ƢƣƸƞƹƢ ƿƩƞƿ ơƺƸƻƞƹǄ i ƩƞƹƢ ƺǁƣƽ ƿƩƣ Ɵǀƾiƹƣƾƾ 
premises in the original condition. 
ᇵ. aبؕ؟؜ؖ؜اج, aآئئؘئئ؜آء, ؔءؗ Lؔءؗ cؘؚ؜ئاؘإ
Property law allocates property by conferring rights in rem (or real rights) 
(dingliche Rechte)23, which have legal effect not only between the parties of a 
contract or other bilateral legal relationship (inter partes), but which can be 
enforced against everyone (erga omnes).24 To make it easy for any interested 
(third) party to ascertain the existence or non- existence of such real rights, 
Swiss property law upholds the principle of publicity (Publizitätsprinzip), 
23 A real right (or right in rem) is a right attached to a movable or immovable property in-
stead of a person.
24 E.g. such as ownership as a real right, conferring absolute freedom within the limits 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ lƞǂ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇸᇶᇳ Iᄭ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƽiƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ƹƞkƣ ƞ ơlƞiƸ ƺƤ ƺǂƹƣƽƾƩiƻ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ ƣǁƣƽǄƺƹƣ 
(Article 641 II).
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according to which rights in rem must be made public through suitable 
means.25
With regard to movable property, it is possession (Besitz), i.e. effective 
ơƺƹƿƽƺl ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇻᇳᇻ Iᄭ, ƿƩƞƿ ƨƽƞƹƿƾ ƻǀƟliơiƿǄ. éơơƺƽƢiƹƨlǄ, ƿƺ ǁƞliƢlǄ ƿƽƞƹƾƤƣƽ 
ownership the new owner must legitimately gain possession (traditio) of the 
chattel (Traditionsprinzip, éƽƿiơlƣèᇹᇳᇶ Iᄭ.26 
There are, however, different forms of possession under Swiss law which 
may result in different legal remedies being available for the different cate-
gories of possessors. First, more than one person is able to possess the same 
chattel at the same time (multiple possession). Thus, effective control can 
be exercised directly (immediate possession) or indirectly via another per-
son (indirect possession). Secondly, whoever exercises effective control as if 
he were the owner of the property has direct possession, while someone who 
exercises effective control based on an obligatory right or a limited right 
in rem has derivative possession ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇻᇴᇲᄭ. eƩiƽƢlǄ, ƻƺƾƾƣƾƾiƺƹ ᄬƞƹƢ ƞlƾƺ 
ownership) can be transferred without the need to physically exchange the 
object of possession (Article 924).
Example: A has borrowed a book from his friend B until the end of the semes-
ter (loan for use pursuant to Article 305 of the Swiss Code of Obligations).27 
Under Swiss law, B can sell his book to C while A may continue keeping and 
using the book. In this case B would need to inform A about the sale of the book 
and instruct him to hand it over to C at the end of the semester. Following the 
ƾƞlƣ, B Ʃƞƾ ƿƽƞƹƾƤƣƽƽƣƢ Ʃiƾ iƹƢiƽƣơƿ ƻƺƾƾƣƾƾiƺƹ ᄬƞƹƢ, ƾiƹơƣ ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƹƺ Ƣiƽƣơƿ/
indirect ownership, full ownership) to C by way of an instruction pursuant to 
Article 924 (Besitzanweisung). A remains the immediate or direct possessor of 
the book and is entitled to refuse delivery of the book to C based on the same 
ƞƽƨǀƸƣƹƿƾ Ʃƣ/ƾƩƣ ơƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ iƹǁƺkƣƢ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ B ǀƹƢƣƽ ƿƩƣ lƺƞƹ Ƥƺƽ ǀƾƣ ᄬC ƸƞǄ, 
therefore, not demand that A deliver the book to C during the semester). 
25 eبآإ/dؖ؛ءجؘؗإ/dؖ؛ؠ؜ؗ, § 88 n. 9. For a discussion of the principle of publicity under 
EƹƨliƾƩ lƞǂ, ƾƣƣ hƺlƤƨƞƹƨ FƞƟƣƽ/Bƽiƨiƿƿƞ Lǀƽƨƣƽ ᄬƣƢƾ.ᄭ, Nƞƿiƺƹƞl cƣƻƺƽƿƾ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ eƽƞƹƾƤƣƽ 
of Movables in Europe, Vol. 6, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Malta, Latvia, in European Legal Studies, Vol. 15, Munich 2011, p. 167.
26 Therefore, possession is a fact and not a right.
27 Federal Act on the Amendment of the Swiss Civil Code of 30 March 1911 (Part Five: The 
Code of Obligations), SR 220; see for the English version of the Code of Obligations www.
ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/éJᇴf- gᇵMBᄭ.
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Since possession usually reveals the existence of real rights on the chattel,28 
the possessor has an interest in excluding third parties from illegitimately 
exercising control over the chattel. Therefore, the Civil Code stipulates the 
action for restitution based on possession ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇻᇴᇹᄭ iƹ ƿƩƣ ƣǁƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƞ ǂƽƺƹƨ-
ful dispossession by any third party.29 Additionally, anyone who has a better 
right to possess the chattel (as opposed to possession as such) can utilise the 
action for restitution based on a right to possession ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾèᇻᇵᇶ ƞƹƢ ᇻᇵᇸᄭ. 
Example: After B had sold the book to C, fellow student D stole the book 
from A who was learning in the library. A (and, for that matter, also C as indi-
rect possessor) could demand restitution of possession based on Article 936 
since D was acting in bad faith when obtaining direct possession. 
However, if the current possessor took possession in good faith30 in the case 
of a chattel which was lost by the previous possessor, the latter must reclaim 
possession within a five year period from the moment the chattel was lost 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇻᇵᇶᄭ. Iƹ ƺƽƢƣƽ ƿƺ ƻƽƺƿƣơƿ ƿƩƣ ƻǀƟliơ ƤƞiƿƩ iƹ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ ƿƽƞƹƾƞơƿiƺƹƾ ƞƹƢ 
business practices, Article 934 II stipulates that whenever a chattel has been 
sold at a public auction, or on the market, or by a merchant dealing in goods 
of the same kind, it may be reclaimed from the first and any subsequent bona 
fide purchaser only against reimbursement of the price paid.
If D immediately after he had stolen the book sells it to E, who acted in good 
faith when purchasing the book, A and C have five years to reclaim their pos-
session from E. Assuming that D is neither a merchant nor sold the book to E on 
ƿƩƣ Ƹƞƽkƣƿ, E ơƞƹƹƺƿ ƢƣƸƞƹƢ ƞƹǄ ƽƣiƸƟǀƽƾƣƸƣƹƿ ƤƽƺƸ é ƺƽ C. dƩƺǀlƢ é ƞƹƢ/
or C fail to reclaim possession (and, in case of C, also ownership) within the 
five year- period, E acquires not only possession, but also ownership (!) based 
on Article 714 II in conjunction with Article 934 even though D as thief was 
neither authorised to transfer possession nor ownership. Consequently, after 
five years E becomes the sole possessor and sole owner of the book if he or she 
acted in good faith.
Further, the previous possessor is not permitted to reclaim possession at 
all if he or she had knowingly and willingly entrusted the chattel to another 
ƻƣƽƾƺƹ, ǂƩƺ ƿƩƣƹ ƿƽƞƹƾƤƣƽƽƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺƻƣƽƿǄ ƿƺ ƞ ƿƩiƽƢ ƻƞƽƿǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇻᇵᇵᄭ. 
28 éƾ ƞ ơƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹơƣ, éƽƿiơlƣèᇻᇵᇲ I ƾƿiƻǀlƞƿƣƾ ƞ ƻƽƣƾǀƸƻƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƺǂƹƣƽƾƩiƻ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ᄬƢiƽƣơƿᄭ 
possessor of the chattel.
29 Immediately after becoming aware of the dispossession and the identity of the offender, 
Ɵǀƿ ƹƺ lƞƿƣƽ ƿƩƞƹ ƺƹƣ Ǆƣƞƽ ƞƤƿƣƽ ƿƩƣ Ƣiƾƻƺƾƾƣƾƾiƺƹ ƺơơǀƽƽƣƢ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇻᇴᇻᄭ.
30 See pp. 285.
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Thus, in our example neither A nor C could reclaim (direct or indirect) pos-
session based on Article 936 if the book had not been stolen, but if A had ins-
tead given it to D as a gift. In this case D, if acting in good faith, is protected 
both with regards to possession and ownership since the chain of possession 
had not been broken by way of an unwanted loss or theft.
While a possessor may only invoke an action for restitution of possession 
based on Article 934 (against a possessor acting in good faith) or Article 936 
(against any possessor acting in bad faith), the owner can, additionally, rec-
laim his or her possession through an action for restitution based on ownership 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇸᇶᇳ IIᄭ. fƹlikƣ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹ iƹ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇻᇵᇶ, ƿƩƣƽƣ iƾ ƹƺ ƾƻƣơiƤiơ ƿiƸƣ 
limitation period for an action based on Article 641 II, but property ownership 
needs to be proven.
In the case of immovable property, any disposition, change of ownership, 
or the creation or cancellation of as well as any amendments to real rights 
and obligations must be recorded in the land register to have legal effect. The 
expectation that the land register and its entries are accurate is guaranteed 
ƟǄ lƞǂ ǀƹƢƣƽ ƿƩƣ ƻƽiƹơiƻlƣ ƺƤ ƨƺƺƢ ƤƞiƿƩ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾèᇻᇹᇳᅬᇻᇹᇶᄭ.
Swiss contract law is characterised by the far- reaching autonomy of the con-
tracting parties. In this area, the law only defines certain boundaries (e.g. pro-
tection of the typically weak); otherwise it allows the parties to autonomously 
create and define the scope of rights and obligations which their legal arrange-
ment will encompass. In property law, on the other hand, contracting parties’ 
autonomy is much more limited. Since rights in rem take effect erga omnes, 
it must be easy for any third party to ascertain their scope. Therefore, Swiss 
property law follows a strict principle of numerus clausus ƺƤ ƽiƨƩƿƾ iƹèƽƣƸ.31 
The principle of numerus clausus regarding rights in rem means that par-
ties can select only from a given set of rights when they want to establish or 
modify a right in rem (in particular by way of contract). In this regard it is 
important to point out that possession in Swiss civil law does not constitute 
a right in rem. However, possession does indicate who has actual control over 
an asset and thereby ensures adherence to the principle of publicity and pro-
tects good faith.
In addition to ownership (Eigentum), Swiss property law only encompasses 
the following rights in rem:
31 The numerus clausus principle means that there is only a limited number of property rights 
available to the parties. As a consequence, parties are not entitled to create “new” property 
rights by deviating from the catalogue of real rights provided by Swiss property law.
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– easement (both on property and limited personal easement);
– usufruct; and
– lien (including charges on chattels, charges on immovable property 
such as mortgages, special liens, and liens on debts).
ᇶ. cب؟ؘئ آؙ Eة؜ؘؗءؘؖ
When the Civil Code came into effect in 1912, the federal legislator lacked 
the competence to legislate on matters of civil procedural law.32 However, it 
was deemed necessary that the Civil Code should address certain procedural 
issues relating to evidence which could not be separated from the substantive 
civil law. Thus, certain civil procedural matters are covered in this legislation.
One such rule is contained in Article 8: unless the law provides otherwise, 
the burden of proof for establishing an alleged fact shall rest on the person who 
would derive rights from that fact. Consequently, the party asserting a claim 
is obligated to prove the legally relevant facts giving rise to and substantiating 
the claim.33 Conversely, the party arguing that a claim is unsubstantiated or 
unenforceable bears the burden to prove the legally relevant facts that make 
the claim unenforceable (e.g. the argument that the applicable limitation 
period has lapsed or that the claimant had granted the defendant a deferral). 
Further, the legislator of the Civil Code foresaw potential evidence- related 
problems with regard to good faith if the party invoking or relying on bona 
fide ǂƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ƿƺ ƻƽƺǁƣ iƿƾ ǁƣƽǄ ƣǃiƾƿƣƹơƣ. eƩƣƽƣƤƺƽƣ, éƽƿiơlƣèᇵ Ƹƞkƣƾ iƿ ơlƣƞƽ 
that where the law makes legal effect conditional on a person’s good faith, 
there shall be a presumption of good faith. However, according to Article 3 II, 
a person cannot invoke the presumption of good faith if he or she has failed 
to exercise the diligence required by the circumstances of the relevant case.
To illustrate this point: A, who is a car dealer, is offered a brand new “Race 
Car Deluxe Limited Edition” by B. B, who had stolen the car a couple of days 
ƣƞƽliƣƽ, iƾ ƞƾkiƹƨ Ƥƺƽ ƞ ƻǀƽơƩƞƾƣ ƻƽiơƣ ƺƤ CHFè ᇵᇲ’ᇲᇲᇲ. eƩƣ ơƞƽ iƹ iƿƾ ơǀƽƽƣƹƿ 
condition is being sold to customers at a market value of CHF 50’000, while 
32 As a matter of fact, only since a referendum in 2000 does the competence for procedural 
law lie with the federal legislator resulting in the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure of 19 
December 2008, SR 272. For details on Swiss Procedural Law, see the Chapter on Civil 
Procedure, pp. 333; see for an English version of the Civil Procedure Code www.admin.ch 
ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ᇹMgG- jabFᄭ. 
33 eبآإ/dؖ؛ءجؘؗإ/dؖ؛ؠ؜ؗ, §èᇹ ƹ.èᇹ.
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the dealer price paid by professional car dealers is approximately CHF 40’000. 
In such a case the low price asked by B should alarm A. Since the car is being 
offered to him 40 % below fair market value and still 25 % off the regular 
dealer price, A could not claim he acted in good faith. Instead, a court would 
argue that he failed to exercise proper diligence when acquiring the car and, 
as a consequence, A would be treated as mala fide (bad faith) possessor.34 
ᇷ. aإؘئبؠؘؗ Cؔأؔؖ؜اج آؙ Jبؘؚؗؠؘءا
Under Swiss law, in order for one’s actions to create legal effect, one must have 
ơƞƻƞơiƿǄ ƺƤ jǀƢƨƣƸƣƹƿ. éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ éƽƿiơlƣèᇳᇸ, ƞ ƻƣƽƾƺƹ iƾ ơƞƻƞƟlƣ ƺƤ ƣǃƣƽơi-
sing judgement within the meaning of the law if he or she does not lack the 
capacity to act rationally by virtue of being below a certain age or because of 
mental disability, mental disorder, intoxication, or due to other similar cir-
cumstances. The capacity of judgment is not determined abstractly, but in 
light of each legal transaction or event taking place. For instance, Article 94 
requires prospective spouses to be at least 18 years old and to have capacity of 
judgement. In this case it is (only) relevant to ascertain that the prospective 
spouses are mentally capable to understand the general concept of marriage 
and to make such decision based on their own free will. In other words, for 
the question of capacity of judgement in relation to a prospective marriage 
it is irrelevant whether or not one of the prospective spouses would also be 
capable of concluding a complex legal contract.
éơơƺƽƢiƹƨ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl ƽǀlƣ ƺƤ ƣǁiƢƣƹơƣ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣè ᇺᄭ, ƿƩƣ ƻƞƽƿǄ iƹǁƺkiƹƨ 
incapacity of judgement as an argument for or against a claim would, in prin-
ciple, have to prove this circumstance. However, capacity of judgement is pre-
sumed under Swiss civil law. Consequently, a party does not have to prove that 
he or she was capable of judgement. As a result, when entering into a contract, 
parties can assume that the other party is legally capable. This presumption 
cannot be rebutted easily or prematurely. Even in cases involving a person 
who constantly brings suits, the presumption cannot be easily rebutted. As 
ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƣlƢ, ƹƺƿ ƣǁƣƽǄƺƹƣ ǂƩƺ ƿƽiƣƾ ƿƺ ƣƹƤƺƽơƣ Ʃiƾ/Ʃƣƽ 
alleged rights in a stubborn manner with all possible means, and occasionally 
even disregards norms of common decency, can be automatically regarded 
34 For a similar case see BGE 107 II 41; see also BGE 113 II 397 where the court held that car 
dealers are subject to a higher standard of due care and diligence in the context of pur-
chases and sales of cars compared to other persons. 
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as a psychopathic grumbler (psychopathischer Querulant) who is incapable 
ƺƤ jǀƢƨƣƸƣƹƿè ᅬ ƣǁƣƹ iƤ Ʃƣ ƺƽ ƾƩƣ ƺǁƣƽƾƿƽƣƿơƩƣƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƞƿiƣƹơƣ ƺƤ ơƺǀƽƿƾ ƞƹƢ 
authorities.35 
It should be pointed out that doctrine and case law seem to be moving 
towards a less extreme approach to the presumption of capacity of judge-
ment. In a case from 2004, the Federal Supreme Court was confronted with 
the following facts: In 1985 and thus at the age of 85, E, who had no close rela-
tives at that time, had drawn up a notarised testament in favour of C and a 
local Swiss community (B). From 1988 onwards E needed intensive care and 
nursing in her home. At the instigation of the competent guardianship autho-
rity, A started taking care of E in July 1988 and both women developed a close 
personal relationship. In September 1988, E, accompanied by A, drew up a 
new notarised testament revoking all prior testamentary dispositions and 
appointing A as E’s sole heiress. Shortly afterwards E died. Upon E’s demise, 
B and C brought forward an action for annulment arguing that E had not 
acted with capacity of judgment when drawing up the second testament. The 
Federal Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ decisions and, effectively, 
declared void the second testament. The Court held that the presumption of 
capacity of judgement cannot be invoked (i.e. the person concerned is regar-
ded as lacking capacity of judgement) if the person concerned, according to 
his or her general constitution, must normally and in all probability be regar-
ded as incapable of exercising judgment. Based on the facts of the case the 
court found that a reduction of the standard of evidence applies and that, as 
a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the person arguing in favour of 
capacity of judgement. Following such a shift of the burden of proof, the party 
confronted with a claim of incapability of judgement may, according to the 
ơƺǀƽƿ, Ɵƽiƹƨ ƤƺƽǂƞƽƢ ƞll Ƥƞơƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƞƽƨǀƸƣƹƿƾ iƹ ƾǀƻƻƺƽƿ ƺƤ Ʃiƾ/Ʃƣƽ ƻƺƾiƿiƺƹ ƟǄ 
providing full proof of capability of judgement.36 
However, this decision raises two questions: Firstly, how can someone 
provide full proof of capability of judgement, in particular in cases where 
the person concerned has already died? Secondly, in an ageing society one 
must be careful not to jump to the conclusion that older people from a cer-
ƿƞiƹ ƞƨƣ ƺƹǂƞƽƢƾ ƺƽ ǂiƿƩ ƞ ơƣƽƿƞiƹ ƩƣƞlƿƩ ơƺƹƢiƿiƺƹ ᄬhƩƞƿ ƞƨƣ/ƩƣƞlƿƩ ơƺƹ-
ditions exactly?) are, in essence, generally presumed to lack capacity of 
35 BGE 98 Ia 324, consideration 3. 
36 Judgment of the FƣƢƣƽƞl dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ᇷC.ᇵᇵ/ᇴᇲᇲᇶ ƺƤ ᇸ OơƿƺƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇶ ᄬiƹ ƻƞƽƿiơǀlƞƽ, ơƺƹ-
siderations 3.1. and 3.2).
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jǀƢƨƣƸƣƹƿèᅬ ƿƩƣƽƣƟǄ ƾƩiƤƿiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƟǀƽƢƣƹ ƺƤ ƻƽƺƺƤ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƺlƢƣƽ ƞƹƢ Ƹƺƽƣ ǁǀlƹƣ-
rable members of society. Hence, it will be interesting to see how Swiss courts 
will decide in the future in potentially less obvious cases than the one descri-
bed above. 
ᇸ. dؘأؔإؔا؜آء aإ؜ءؖ؜أ؟ؘ
Part 1 of the Civil Code regulates the legal personality of legal persons in 
Switzerland. In Swiss law, so- called legal persons ( juristische Personen) pos-
sess all the same rights and duties as natural persons, except for those which 
presuppose intrinsically human attributes, such as gender, age, or kinship 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇷᇵᄭ.
The decision to grant legal persons legal capacity and hence the ability to 
possess rights and be subjected to obligations, raises questions regarding 
(i) the internal relationship between the legal person and its owners, foun-
ders, or members and (ii) the external relationship of the legal person vis- à- vis 
third parties. In this regard, Swiss civil law follows the so- called separation 
principle (Trennungsprinzip), a fundamental rule of Swiss civil law in general 
and the Law of Persons in particular.
Under the separation principle, a legal person is separated both in legal and 
economic terms from its members, owners, or founders. In other words, the 
legal person itself is not just the sum of its members, owners, or founders; 
instead, it carries out its own activities and participates independently in eco-
nomic and legal transactions. Hence, the legal person, and not the natural 
persons behind it, is the sole owner of its assets and the sole debtor of its obli-
gations. Consequently, the members, owners (i.e. shareholders), or founders 
are neither entitled to the legal person’s assets nor liable to third parties for 
its debts.37
37 Of course, shareholders are entitled to a company’s profits by way of dividends. However, 
shareholders cannot simply demand that a certain asset (e.g. real estate), belonging to 
the company be gifted to them (this would also be considered a breach of the fiduciary 
duties of the company’s board of directors).
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III. LƞƹƢƸƞƽk Cƞƾƣƾ
The Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgericht) in Lausanne is the highest court 
in Switzerland and also the highest instance court for civil cases. Parties may 
only appeal to the Federal Supreme Court if they have exhausted all other 
procedures before hierarchically lower courts. When considering civil law 
matters, the main task of the Federal Supreme Court is to secure the con-
sistent application of Swiss civil law throughout Switzerland. However, the 
Federal Supreme Court does not engage in reassessing the substance of a case 
or hearing new facts. Instead, it focuses only on whether the law has been 
correctly applied and interpreted.
ᇳ. Lؘؚؔؖج Hبءاؘإ38
In 2006 the Federal Supreme Court was given the (rare) opportunity (i) to 
shed light on the question whether a duty to inform can be derived from the 
general principle of good faith according to Article 2 I and (ii) to elaborate on 
grounds for unworthiness to inherit pursuant to Article 540.
E was born on 7 February 1907. She married an industrialist from Dresden. 
The marriage remained childless. A few years after the death of her husband, 
E relocated to and settled in Basel. She lived in her own flat, independently 
and without need for nursing care. On the 8 or 9 December 1993, E fell heavily 
in her apartment where she laid on the ground for a while without care or 
help. Following her accident, E (hereinafter: testator) was admitted to a nur-
sing home 1993 where she died on 9 July 1995. 
K ᄬƩƣƽƣiƹƞƤƿƣƽ: ƻlƞiƹƿiƤƤᄭ ơƺƸƣƾ ƤƽƺƸ ƞ ƤƞƸilǄ ƿƩƞƿ ƟƣlƺƹƨƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ơiƽơlƣ ƺƤ 
friends or acquaintances of the testator. According to a will dated 31 August 
ᇳᇻᇺᇹ, ƿƩƣ ƿƣƾƿƞƿƺƽ ƞƻƻƺiƹƿƣƢ K ƞƾ ƾƺlƣ Ʃƣiƽ. Iƹ ƞ ƾǀƻƻlƣƸƣƹƿ ƿƺ ƿƩƞƿ ǂill, ƿƩƣ 
ƿƣƾƿƞƿƺƽ ơƺƹƤiƽƸƣƢ K’ƾ ƻƺƾiƿiƺƹ ƞƾ ƾƺlƣ Ʃƣiƽ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ᇳᇲ MƞƽơƩ ᇳᇻᇻᇳ.
B (hereinafter: defendant) acted as the testator’s lawyer from 1991 until, pre-
sumably, her death. According to the facts the Federal Supreme Court was 
38 BGE 132 III 305.
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bound by, the defendant has been the lawyer of the testator since 1991 and has 
also discussed hereditary issues with her. When asked about her wishes regar-
ding her estate, the testator replied to the defendant with the words: “That’s 
you.” During a visit at the nursing home, the defendant was informed by the 
testator in April 1994 about her will and that she had appointed the defendant 
as her sole heir. The defendant took this testament dated 2 December 1993 
with him when he left the testator.
In addition to the relationship of trust as the testator’s nominated lawyer, 
the defendant exercised great personal influence over the testator. The tes-
tator has not only been in a relationship of trust with the defendant, but 
continued to be in an actual relationship of dependency. With constant gifts 
the testator wanted to gain and maintain the friendship and affection of the 
defendant. The defendant was almost the sole reference person of the testator. 
The testator assumed that the defendant’s consideration towards her was the 
result of genuine friendship and affection, and in this light she appointed the 
defendant as her sole heir. The defendant, on the other hand, did not act on 
the basis of friendship, but wanted to enrich himself. As the courts held, the 
defendant’s true intentions have remained hidden from the testator.
In a handwritten will dated 16 November 1992 or 1993 (the exact year 
could not be determined), the testator appointed the defendant as her sole 
heir and executor and instructed him to pay out a certain sum as a legacy 
(Vermächtnis) to the plaintiff. In a testament dated 2 December 1993, the tes-
tator confirmed the defendant as sole heir and executor, but this time she did 
not include in the new will the legacy in favour of the plaintiff. Finally, in a 
letter to the defendant dated 25 February 1995, the testator revoked all previ-
ous testamentary dispositions and instructions, with the exception of those 
in favour of the defendant.
The plaintiff challenged the defendant’s appointment as the sole heir and 
executor of the testator and, inter alia, brought an action seeking annulment 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƾƿƞƸƣƹƿ ƢƞƿƣƢ ᇴè DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇳᇻᇻᇵ, ƾƿƞƿiƹƨ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƤƣƹƢƞƹƿ ǂƞƾ 
unworthy to inherit and thus incapable to act as executor. The civil court of 
Bƞƾƣl- dƿƞƢƿ ƢƣơlƞƽƣƢ ƿƩƣ lƞƾƿ ǂill ƺƤ ᇴ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽèᇳᇻᇻᇵ iƹǁƞliƢ. eƩƣ ƞƻƻƣllƞƿƣ 
court of the canton of Basel- Stadt came to the contrary conclusion that the 
last will of 2 December 1993 was valid. However, the appellate court ultima-
tely allowed the claim and found that the defendant was unworthy to inherit 
and incapable of exercising the office of executor.
With his appeal, the defendant requested to be, essentially, reinstated as 
executor and declared sole heir of the testator. The appeal was dismissed by 
the Federal Supreme Court.
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With regards to the unworthiness of the defendant to inherit, the Federal 
Supreme Court had to answer the question whether the defendant, as the lawyer 
of the testator, had been under the duty to inform her about his conflict of inte-
rest (as lawyer and presumed sole heir) and, as a result, had maliciously preven-
ƿƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƾƿƞƿƺƽ ƤƽƺƸ Ƹƞkiƹƨ ƞ ƹƣǂ ƞƹƢ/ƺƽ ƽƣǁƺkiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƣǃiƾƿiƹƨ ᄬlƞƾƿᄭ ǂill.
Firstly, the court held that the malicious act or omission pursuant to Article 
540 I No 3 does not require that a criminal act had been committed. Secondly, 
the court confirmed the view that there must be a causal relationship bet-
ween the malicious act or omission and the fact that the decedent did not 
make or revoke a will. In cases of a potential failure to provide advice and 
information, the hypothetical causality must be analysed. In other words, one 
Ƹǀƾƿ ƞƾk ǂƩƣƿƩƣƽèᅬ ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ ƞƹ ƺƽƢiƹƞƽǄ ơƺǀƽƾƣ ƺƤ ƣǁƣƹƿƾ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣ ƨƣƹƣƽƞl 
ƣǃƻƣƽiƣƹơƣ ƺƤ liƤƣèᅬ ƞ ƿƣƾƿƞƿƺƽ ǂƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ƸƞƢƣ, ƞƸƣƹƢƣƢ, ƺƽ ƽƣǁƺkƣƢ ƞ ƿƣƾƿƞ-
ment had he or she been informed in a proper manner.
The court then turned to the question whether the defendant was under a 
legal obligation to inform the testator about his true intentions which were 
not based on genuine friendship and about the conflict of interest arising from 
his simultaneous position as the testator’s appointed sole heir and lawyer. The 
court repeated that from 1991 until her death the defendant was the only refe-
rence person for the testator. From the testator’s perspective, this was much 
more than a working or purely professional relationship. Against this back-
ground, the court relied on the principle of good faith (Article 2) requiring 
parties to a legal relationship to act in an appropriate and honest manner. By 
ƹƺƿ iƹƤƺƽƸiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƿƣƾƿƞƿƺƽ ƞƟƺǀƿ Ʃiƾ ƿƽǀƣèᅬ i.ƣ. ƻǀƽƣlǄ ƣơƺƹƺƸiơèᅬ  iƹƿƣƹƿiƺƹƾ 
and the conflict of interest as the testator’s appointed heir and lawyer, the 
defendant had caused the testator to believe that they had a genuine friends-
hip. Against this background the testator kept the defendant as the sole heir 
and executor until her death. Interestingly, the court did see that the testator, 
ƤƽƺƸ ƞ lƣƨƞl ƻƺiƹƿ ƺƤ ǁiƣǂ, ơƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞƸƣƹƢƣƢ ƺƽ ƽƣǁƺkƣƢ Ʃƣƽ lƞƾƿ ǂill ƞƹƢ/ƺƽ 
made a new testament at any time. However, it emphasised that the testator 
had relied on the (wrong) assumption that she and the defendant shared a 
friendship which made her believe there was no need to revoke her will or to 
make a new one. 
In the eyes of the court, the defendant’s failure to inform the testator about 
his true intentions as well as of his conflict of interest qualified as a grave 
misconduct on his part resulting in his unworthiness to inherit and to act as 
executor.
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ᇴ. Cؔأؔؖ؜اج اآ Mؔإإج39 
In this case the Federal Supreme Court was given the opportunity to exa-
mine the significance, meaning, and implications of the capacity of judgment 
(Article 16) in the context of a (prospective) marriage.
P, born in 1951 and E, born in 1934, had lived together since 1979 and in that 
year the couple initiated the formal preparatory procedure with the aim to 
ƸƞƽƽǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣèᇻᇹ Iᄭ.40 
During the preparatory procedure, P’s mother, siblings, and in- laws spoke 
out against the marriage and, ultimately, brought forward an application to 
prohibit the prospective marriage. They claimed that P was mentally disa-
bled and thus lacked capacity of judgement with regards to the prospective 
marriage. 
Based on three court appointed experts’ opinions, the court of first instance 
came to the conclusion that P’s mental deficiency was in the border area bet-
ween debility and imbecility. However, the court of first instance held that 
neither the couple’s own interests nor those of other persons exclude the pro-
spective marriage. It stated that marrying E was evidently in P’s interest since 
she could remain in her familiar environment. P, who was pregnant at that 
time, was from a medical point of view also not in danger of passing on her 
mental condition onto her offspring, thereby rendering moot this (ethically 
very weak, to say the least) line of argument. As the court, dismissing the 
claim brought forward by P’s family, said: “Since P […] could expect some help 
from E […] in fulfilling her duties as a housewife and mother and since the sim-
ple, nature- loving life on the farm as well as the harmony between [the couple] 
could compensate for some educational shortcomings, it cannot be said that the 
child’s interests […] necessarily preclude the marriage.” P’s family appealed this 
decision to the Higher Court, but to no avail. With their appeal to the Federal 
Supreme Court the claimants essentially repeated their arguments presented 
to the lower courts. 
With regard to the capacity to marry (Article 97 I), the Federal Supreme 
Court had to decide whether P should be regarded as having capacity of 
39 BGE 109 II 273.
40 In a nutshell, the aim of the preparatory procedure is to give the civil register the oppor-
tunity to assure itself that the marriage requirements are met (inter alia, that no fake 
marriage takes place, that the prospective spouses are not already married to other per-
sons, and that the spouses are capable of marrying).
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judgement pursuant to Article 16. Agreeing with the lower courts, it held that 
the (in- )capacity of judgement cannot be determined, once and for all, in an 
abstract manner without regard to the specific circumstances of each indivi-
dual case. 
The Federal Supreme Court held that, as far as the capacity to marry is 
concerned, one must (only) determine whether the fiancées have the mental 
maturity to enter into marriage with the concrete partner and whether they 
are capable of understanding the concept and meaning of a marriage and the 
mutual obligations resulting from it. Interestingly, the court continues by sta-
ting that the requirements regarding the capacity of judgement in the context 
of marrying are higher compared to the capacity of judgement in business or 
commercial dealings. At the same time, however, the requirements must not 
be so high to effectively render meaningless marriage as a constitutionally 
guaranteed right for too large a part of the population. 
In its decision the Federal Supreme Court recalled that the reason for the 
requirement of Article 97 I was to prevent from the very beginning (dysfunc-
tional) marriages which can never result in a true communion between two 
people. In addition, this provision wishes to protect the mentally incapable 
weak(er) person from being at the mercy of his or her spouse. 
However, in a case like the present, capacity of judgement can be affirmed if 
the marriage is only beneficial for the mentally disabled person. By repeating 
the facts determined by the lower courts, the Federal Supreme Court found 
that a marriage with E was in the best interest of P and that she was to be con-
sidered as having capacity of judgement to enter into the marriage according 
to Article 97 I. 
ᇵ. Fآآاؠؔء ت؜ا؛ dؔؠآةؔإ41
In a landmark case involving a famous artwork, the Federal Supreme Court 
clarified its view with regard to claims for restitution based on possession 
(Articles 934 and 936) and the relevant question of good or bad faith of the 
ơǀƽƽƣƹƿ ƻƺƾƾƣƾƾƺƽ iƹ liƨƩƿ ƺƤ éƽƿiơlƣèᇵ.
Iƹ ᇳᇻᇺᇻ, Mƽ.è hƣƽƹƣƽ MƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ, ƞƹ iƸƻƺƽƿƞƹƿ ƻƽiǁƞƿƣ ơƺllƣơƿƺƽ ƺƤ ơƺƹ-
temporary art, acquired for just over $ 1 million the painting “Footman 
41 BGE 139 III 305; the details, including the names of the parties involved, are publicly 
known.
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ǂiƿƩ dƞƸƺǁƞƽ” ǂƩiơƩ ǂƞƾ ƻƞiƹƿƣƢ iƹ ᇳᇻᇳᇶ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ cǀƾƾiƞƹ ƞƽƿiƾƿ KƞƾiƸiƽ 
Sewerinowitsch Malewitsch, one of the most prominent representatives of 
the so- called Cubo- Futurism school. The sale had been executed on a com-
mission basis by a gallery in Geneva, with the seller remaining anonymous.42
aƽiƺƽ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ ƞơƼǀiƾiƿiƺƹ, Mƽ.èMƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ ƩƞƢ ơƺƹƾǀlƿƣƢ ǂiƿƩ ƞƹ ƣǃƻƣƽƿ ǂƩƺ 
had confirmed the authenticity of the artwork. However, the expert had also, 
ƞƿ ƿƩiƾ ƻƺiƹƿ, iƹƤƺƽƸƣƢ Mƽ.èMƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƽǀƸƺǀƽƾ ǂƩiơƩ ǂƣƽƣ ơiƽơǀlƞ-
ting in the art world claiming that a stolen artwork from Malewitsch was 
ƞƻƻƞƽƣƹƿlǄ ƺƹ ƿƩƣ Ƹƞƽkƣƿ. CƺƹƾƣƼǀƣƹƿlǄ, Mƽ.èMƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ iƹiƿiƞƿƣƢ ƣǃƿƣƹƾiǁƣ 
investigations regarding the “Footman with Samovar” and contacted organi-
sations including Interpol about the matter. These investigations yielded no 
results.
Iƹ ᇴᇲᇲᇶ, ƞ cǀƾƾiƞƹ ƞƽƿ ơƺllƣơƿƺƽ ƤilƣƢ ƞ lƞǂƾǀiƿ ƞƨƞiƹƾƿ Mƽ.èMƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ Ƥƺƽ 
restitution of possession based on Articles 934 and 936 (basically arguing 
ƿƩƞƿ Mƽ.èMƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ ǂƞƾ ƹƺƿ ƞ Ɵƺƹƞ ƤiƢƣ ƻƺƾƾƣƾƾƺƽ, Ɵǀƿ ƩƞƢ ƞơƿƣƢ iƹ ƟƞƢ ƤƞiƿƩ 
when acquiring the artwork). He claimed that the “Footman with Samovar” 
had been stolen from the private collection of his parents in 1978, and argued 
ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩiƾ ǂƞƾ ƞ Ƥƞơƿ ƿƩƞƿ Mƽ.èMƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ ƟƺƿƩ ơƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ƞƹƢ ƺǀƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ʃƞǁƣ 
known.
Both the District Court of Meilen as the court of first instance and the High 
Court of the Canton of Zurich as the second instance dismissed the case. 
eƩƣǄ ƿƺƺk ƿƩƣ ǁiƣǂ ƿƩƞƿ Mƽ.èMƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ ƹƣiƿƩƣƽ ƩƞƢ ƹƺƽ ƺǀƨƩƿ ƿƺ Ʃƞǁƣ ƩƞƢ 
knowledge of the theft of the painting and, therefore, bona fide could be assu-
ƸƣƢ ƟƞƾƣƢ ƺƹ éƽƿiơlƣ ᇵ I. eƩƣ lƺǂƣƽ ơƺǀƽƿƾ ƩƣlƢ ƿƩƞƿ Mƽ.èMƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ ƩƞƢ ƣǃƣƽ-
cised proper and due diligence because he had initiated investigations prior 
to making the purchase.
The Federal Supreme Court, however, set aside the decision and remitted 
the case to the High Court of the Canton of Zurich. In particular, the Federal 
dǀƻƽƣƸƣ Cƺǀƽƿ ƩƣlƢ ƿƩƞƿ Mƽ.è MƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ ƾƩƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ ơƺƹƢǀơƿƣƢ Ƹƺƽƣ 
detailed investigations and that, therefore, the presumption of bona fide does 
not apply in the current case. The court, having regard to Article 3 II, poin-
ƿƣƢ ƺǀƿ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƞƽƿ ƣǃƻƣƽƿ ƩƞƢ iƹƤƺƽƸƣƢ Mƽ.è MƣƽǅƟƞơƩƣƽ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƞ ơƺƹơƽƣƿƣ 
rumour indicating that “Footman with Samovar” might have been stolen. 
This was a clear warning sign considering that paintings from Malewitsch 
have only very rarely been put on the market for sale in the relevant period. In 
42 The details and facts of this complex case are contained in the decision CG040012 of the 
District Court of Meilen of 21 December 2010. 
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the court’s own words, “[i]t is sufficient that at the time, from an objective point 
of view, the consultation of one or more experts would have been a suitable (if 
not the most appropriate) and reasonable measure to find out more about this 
rumour and any defects or limitations of the right of disposal on the part of the 
seller.”
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